analysis : 4 University of Michigan public safety failures that contributed to 6-month child-porn reporting delay

Posted on Tue, Oct 23, 2012 : 5:59 a.m.

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In winter 2011 University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman learned that at least eight officials failed to timely report a pediatrician caught looking at child pornography while at work.

The six-month reporting lapse occurred because of a variety of reasons, including poor decisions by university attorneys and the misconception that hospital security acted as police.

But perhaps one of the most significant factors leading to the lapse was the animosity between hospital security and university police, which multiple individuals say contributed to a "culture of fear and blame" between the units.

Simply put, security and police had a communication problem.

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University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman reacts when the Board of Regents, in February, orders additional investigations of the six-month child porn reporting lapse. Coleman knew the order was coming.

Melanie Maxwell I AnnArbor.com

The Board of Regents in March commissioned Margolis Healy to conduct a review of the safety culture, where if fell short and how insufficiencies contributed to the six-month reporting lapse that allowed Stephen Jenson, 37, to work alongside children at University Hospital while viewing child porn at his home and, worse, during shifts at work.

The review cost the university $120,000 —$15,000 more than the school's original estimate— and investigators visited campus during a three-day period in April, interviewing dozens of hospital, housing, security and police officials.

The result was a scathing report of problems between the Department of Public Safety, hospital security and, less so, housing security.

Investigators found that high leadership turnover in DPS and unclear crime reporting protocol, coupled with disjointed communication and blatant distrust between units, crippled U-M's safety enterprise, putting the school at risk for a situation such as the Jenson incident.

The final report, along with another investigation that looked into the circumstances surrounding the Jenson incident, was announced Friday during a Board of Regents meeting in Flint. Citing attorney-client privilege, the university declined to release details of the Jenson investigation, which cost the school $487,000.

The reports prompted U-M to launch a Division of Public Safety and Security, which has oversight over campus police, hospital security and housing security. Although the division launched on Friday, U-M officials have offered few details, responding to questions by saying guidelines and parameters for the division haven't been fully set yet.

AnnArbor.com analyzed the Margolis Healy report and, pulling direct quotes from investigators, identified four primary problems of the U-M security enterprise.

The full report is available here: MargolisHealyFullReport.pdf

1) Broken and nonexistent trust between units:

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Speaking on behalf of the University of Michigan Board of Regents, S. Martin Taylor in February 2012 announced that U-M would order further investigations of the six-month child porn reporting lapse.

Melanie Maxwell | AnnArbor.com

  • Relationship issues center on a lack of trust and poor collaboration between hospital security and DPS, and are less problematic with housing security.
  • We could find no specific reference explaining why the relationships with DPS deteriorated, or if it was ever healthy. Some speculate that the relationships soured when DPS became a full service law enforcement agency in 1990 and believe this change brought about a new culture in DPS.
  • One particular interviewee with a perspective into both organizations shared the belief that hospital security does not want to be accountable to DPS or have DPS involved in their “business.” At the same time, they articulated a belief that DPS is suspicious of hospital security; doesn’t respect its role; and ignores health care.
  • Hospital security and DPS are protective of their respective areas of responsibility, and as a result may struggle to move beyond their points of view to address the tension and mistrust between them.
  • [DPS officers'] perception that hospital security leadership has little interest in collaborating with DPS is pervasive.
  • DPS officers shared examples of hospital staff (medical) not recognizing DPS authority and responsibility to investigate crimes on hospital property, and stories of hospital employees interfering with investigations.
  • Too much emphasis has been placed on [whether firearms should be allowed in areas of the hospital], with little discussion of the underlying issue - the tension and lack of trust between DPS and hospital security front line staff.

2) Fear of DPS by some security officers, staff members:

  • Many thought that DPS comes across as pushy and intimidating.... Among those we interviewed, DPS was not generally viewed as respectful of the hospital environment.
  • We consistently heard that the average health care practitioner fears interacting with DPS because of their tactics. One often cited example, for instance, is the story of the HHC risk manager who was threatened with criminal charges while seeking advice from legal counsel to evaluate a release of information.
  • Incidents contribute to a fear of DPS by some medical staff. [Examples include DPS officers acting like]: "This badge and gun give me the right to ask anyone questions," and examples of university police officers threatening to arrest HHC employees on obstruction of justice charges.
  • Some hospital security interviewed perceives a negative attitude by DPS during interactions with patients, staff and visitors.
  • There is a pervasive belief {among security] that DPS does not understand the security mission of the hospital and health care system, or how hospital security operates in furtherance of this mission. “We are always under attack by DPS and we do not know why,” many of the interviewees told us. “They do not look at us as a valuable resource/partner.”
  • DPS staff confirmed that they have indicated that they would arrest medical staff for obstruction of justice and interfering with investigations. Threats of such arrests have become a core issue between DPS and medical, legal and security staff.
  • [A housing employee said:] “we don’t need or want police in the buildings... no guns patrolling the hallways,” [This] struck us as indicative that this partnership does not exist.

3) Unclear roles between units and poor communication:

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    37-year-old Stephen Jenson

  • All [units] use the moniker “Public Safety,” causing confusion for our team.
  • In the hospitals and health care system, people seeking help often believe that they are speaking with, or calling, the police only to realize later that they are or were speaking to or calling a security officer.... The use of the emergency number 911 by both DPS and hospital security to contact their respective departments adds to the confusion.
  • The hospital security website lists Director Marilyn Hollier as an associate director of public safety, presumably having a reporting line to the director of public safety but this is not the case. (An AnnArbor.com review shows that Hollier is still referred to this way on the website.)
  • Regarding the issue of firearms in the hospital environment, DPS officers do not appear to accurately understand the rules and regulations that the hospital must follow in accordance with its accreditation status.
  • Hospital administrators themselves may not appreciate how a well-trained and armed police service cares for their needs. The overall perception in DPS of an umbrella policy that DPS officers are not allowed to carry firearms in the hospital is problematic, and inaccurate.
  • When a theft occurs in the Hospital, the hospital security investigator will determine if the incident is criminal in nature, and if it is, the investigator will call police dispatch so that a DPS officer can handle the situation.... DPS staff we interviewed... preferred to be called for all potential criminal incidents.
  • The real issue is [setting clear] the expectations for DPS officers when in the hospitals and health care system.

4) Lack of leadership and protocol

  • Some of the hospital security staff we interviewed believes that a lack of stability in the leadership at DPS in recent years has contributed to the issues between the two departments. The instability has led to confusion in the areas of policies and procedures and the enforcement of rules and regulations.
  • Lack of reporting priorities, collaboration and communication has led to a palpable lack of trust and respect between the front line staff of DPS and hospital security.
  • DPS officers perceive that hospital security is permitted to investigate low-level crimes (it is unclear how these are defined), and only refers those crimes that require actual criminal charges to DPS.
  • What is concerning is the lack of agreed upon protocols for what crimes are to be reported to DPS and when the report should be made. In this area, we see a slippery slope. Much of this is now being addressed in recently issued reporting guidelines.
  • DPS personnel did not self-identify to us as service oriented, community policing and problem-solving officers. This is not how hospital security or housing security, by and large, experiences them.
  • DPS police officers appear to be directing their attention towards validation from the greater law enforcement community and away from their focus on serving a university community as a community-oriented campus public safety organization. A community focus and enforcement are not dichotomous.

Kellie Woodhouse covers higher education for AnnArbor.com. Reach her at kelliewoodhouse@annarbor.com or 734-623-4602 and follow her on twitter.

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